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Abstract:

Based on the cross-sectional data about the municipal Party committee
secretaries sacked since the 18th CPC National Congress, this paper adopts a
regression model to examine and assess the impact of local top Party leaders’
corruption. The study discovers that local heads’ integrity directly affects
local political ecology they are in; that regions in the charge of corruptive
heads suffer a higher degree of corruption; and that the tenure of corruptive
local heads relates much to the degree of local corruption (i.e. the longer their
tenure is, the more baneful influence they exert on the clean governance
of local leaders and cadres). Consequently, it is imperative to establish and
consolidate a power structure and a corresponding operating mechanism
which enable effective mutual constraint and balance among decisionmaking power, executive power and supervision power. Only by doing so
can China alleviate the negative impact of local heads’ corruption, effectively
restrict and supervise local heads’ exercise of power, and maintain a well
balance between “power delegation” and “power supervision”.

Keywords: local heads; sacked secretaries of municipal Party committee; degree of
corruption; proportion of secretaries investigated

T

he top leader occupying the core position in a leading body plays an
important and even decisive role in the overall work of the group or
department, and his personal corruption might lead to collective corruption
of the group, even the whole department. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the
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Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, pointed out, “Among the corrupt officials
investigated by us, top leaders of various quarters
account for a large proportion. This shows that
supervision over top leaders is still a weak link.”
According to scholar Qiao Defu’s statistics, from the
beginning of reform and opening–up to the end of
2013, a total of 54 top leaders at the provincial and
departmental level, 177 top leaders at the prefecture
level and 544 top leaders at the county level were
sacked for corruption, and the cases of collective
corruption masterminded by them account for
nearly 70%. A few top leaders’ corruption not only
seriously damages the local political ecology, but
also hinders healthy local economic and social
development. This paper, according to cross–
sectional data of the municipal Party committee
secretaries sacked after the Eighteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (as
of June 2016), uses a regression model to carry
out analysis and further examine and evaluate the
influence of local top Party leaders’ corruption in
the hope of strengthening prediction of corruption
trends and selection of corruption governance
strategies.

1. Research hypotheses
After controlling economic and institutional
factors, this paper selects the influence factor of
municipal Party committee secretaries, examines
sacked municipal Party committee secretaries’
influence on corruption in the places where they held
office through analyzing the dimensions of whether
the municipal Party committee secretary is corrupt
or not, the sacked municipal Party committee

secretary’s term of office, the sacked municipal
Party committee secretary’s length of work at the
place of service① and the sacked municipal Party
committee secretary’s original post,② and measures
the intensity of such influence. Therefore, the
following research hypotheses are put forward:
H1: A corrupt municipal Party committee
secretary worsens the degree of corruption in the
place of service.
H2: The longer a corrupt municipal Party
committee secretary’s term of office, the higher the
level of the place’s corruption.
H3: The longer a corrupt municipal Party
committee secretary’s length of work at the place of
service (including the length of serving as municipal
Party committee secretary and the length of holding
other posts in the same place), the higher the level of
the place’s corruption.
H4a: A corrupt municipal Party committee
secretary promoted in the same city has greater
influence on the degree of local corruption.
H4b: A corrupt municipal Party committee
secretary promoted in another city or transferred at
the same level has greater influence on the degree of
local corruption.
H4c: A corrupt municipal Party committee
secretary dispatched from a provincial department has
greater influence on the degree of local corruption.

2. Statistical description and empirical
method
2.1 Sample and sources of data
Based on theoretical analysis of officials’
corruption and collective corruption, this paper
puts forward the above theoretical hypotheses and

① The sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s length of work at the place of service refers to the sum of the length of serving as municipal Party committee
secretary and the length of holding other posts in the same place.
② The sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s origin is dispatch from a provincial department, promotion in the same city, cross-city promotion or samelevel transfer.
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establishes the corresponding regression models
to empirically test them with the municipal Party
committee secretaries sacked after the Eighteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of
China as the sample. The data selected for research
include personal data of the municipal Party
committee secretaries sacked after the Eighteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, statistical data of the cities where the sacked
municipal Party committee secretaries held office,
statistical data of the cities where no municipal Party
committee secretary was sacked after the Eighteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, and data of cities’ degree of corruption.
As for personal data of the sacked municipal
Party committee secretaries, their data are mainly
obtained through checking publicly available
information about the municipal Party committee
secretaries sacked after the Eighteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China from the
website of the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection of the Communist Party of China, main
Chinese news media, newspapers, periodicals and
books to confirm that 36 municipal Party committee
secretaries were sacked after the Eighteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China,
involving 17 provinces and autonomous regions
including Henan, Sichuan, Anhui, Shanxi, Hebei,
Jiangxi, Fujian, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong,
Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Zhejiang, Guizhou,
Qinghai, Heilongjiang and Guangxi. Data include
the sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s
name, age, length of service as secretary, length of
work, original post and time of downfall.
As for data of numbers of people involved in
cases of work–related crimes placed on file in the
cities where the sacked municipal Party committee
secretaries worked, the precondition of obtaining
such cross–sectional data is selecting data of
numbers of people involved in cases of work–related
58

crimes placed on file in the work reports of the cities’
prosecutors for the years when they were sacked. If
there was no data, then the data for the year before
the downfall are selected to ensure the work–related
crimes in the cities occurred within their terms of
office and near the years of their downfall. Data
of numbers of people involved in cases of work–
related crimes placed on file in the cities where 23
municipal Party committee secretaries sacked after
the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China worked were obtained from public
data. Among them, the corruption of Gao Jinsong
(sacked as Secretary of the Kunming Municipal
Committee of the Communist Party of China)
mainly took place in Qujing and the corruption of
Liao Shaohua (sacked as Secretary of the Zunyi
Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of
China) mainly took place in Qiandongnan, so the
numbers of people involved in cases of work–related
crimes placed on file in Qujing and Qiandongnan
Prefecture for the years when they left the two cities
were selected for data entry.
As for data of numbers of people involved in
cases of work–related crimes placed on file in the
cities where no municipal Party committee secretary
was sacked after the Eighteenth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China, with the exception
of the cities in Tibet and Xinjiang, control cities’
data are obtained through random sampling without
replacement. Because many cities did not publicly
release work reports of the local procuratorates
online, even though there are relevant public data of
some cities, they are excluded in this paper to ensure
data authenticity and reliability because they are not
from official websites. Data of numbers of people
involved in cases of work–related crimes placed on
file in 22 cities were finally selected, all from the
2015 work reports of these cities’ procuratorates.
As for statistical data for the cities where the
municipal Party committee secretaries sacked
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after the Eighteenth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China worked and the cities
where no municipal Party committee secretary was
sacked after the Eighteenth National Congress of
the Communist Party of China, such data comes
from China’s city statistical yearbooks and various
provinces’ statistical yearbooks, with the years of
data corresponding to the years of data about degrees
of corruption. The specific data include per capita
GDP, government expenditures, employers’ average
pay, number of employees, number of employees in
public administration and social organizations and
average pay of employees in public administration
and social organizations.
2.2 Selection of variables
The dependent variable is the city’s degree of
corruption, the independent variables are whether
the municipal Party committee secretary is corrupt
or not, the sacked municipal Party committee
secretary’s length of work at the place of service and
the sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s
origin, and the control variables are economic
development, the government size, government
officials’ relative pay and separation of powers at the
municipal level.
(1) Dependent variable
Because corruption has very complicated,
diverse and secret forms, it is difficult to accurately
measure it. At present, academic circles mainly
use two methods to measure a region’s degree of
corruption. One is obtaining the corruption index
through calculation with survey data, e.g. data such
as a country’s clean government index, corruption
governance and corruption records in International
Country Risk Guide, which are mainly subjective data
for country–to–country comparisons of corruption.
The other is measuring corruption with actual
corruption crime rates. This paper adopts the ratio of
the number of people investigated for work–related
crimes in various cities’ government officials, i.e.

a region’s degree of corruption=number of people
involved in cases of work–related crimes placed on
file/number of employees in public administration
and social organizations, denoted by corruption.
(2) Independent variables
The core independent variables to which this
paper gives attention include whether the municipal
Party committee secretary is corrupt or not, the sacked
municipal Party committee secretary’s term of office,
the sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s
length of work at the place of service and the sacked
municipal Party committee secretary’s origin.
Whether the municipal Party committee secretary is
corrupt or not is a dummy variable, denoted by sacked.
The corrupt municipal Party committee secretaries
are the treatment group, assigned the value of 1; the
uncorrupt municipal Party committee secretaries
are the reference group, assigned the value of 0. The
sacked municipal Party committee secretary’s term
of office, denoted by tenure, is the specific number
of years since the sacked municipal Party committee
secretary took up the post. The sacked municipal Party
committee secretary’s length of work at the place
where he was finally sacked, denoted by working
life, is the sum of the length of serving as municipal
Party committee secretary and the length of holding
other posts in the same place. The sacked municipal
Party committee secretary’s origin is dispatch from
a provincial department, promotion in the same city,
cross–city promotion or same–level transfer, denoted
by where. With dispatch from provincial departments
as reference groups, the dummy variables of promotion
in the same city, cross–city promotion and same–
level transfer were selected, assigned the value of 1
respectively.
(3) Control variables
Economic development: China’s economic
development and the trend of frequent occurrence of
corruption have always been a hot topic of discussion
in the academic circles, but no consensus on the
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causal relationship between the two has been reached
until now. Some scholars point out that decisive
factors of corruption and the causal relationship
theory emphasize existence of an overt relationship
between economic development and corruption and
that a higher level of economic development can lead
to a lower degree of corruption, while corruption
causes slower economic development. Other scholars
think that corruption originated from economic
development and that corrupt officials plunder new
wealth created through reform instead of existing
wealth. Still other scholars propose that economic
development’s influence on corruption is manifested
as a reverse U–shaped curve and that the observed
results are a positive correlation between economic
development and corruption because China’s level
of economic development is still low. Finally, some
scholars think that the influence of various Chinese
provinces and cities’ economic development on the
circumstances of local corrupt officials’ corruption
is not prominent. This paper selects the level of
economic development as a control variable for
measuring the degree of corruption, represented by
various areas’ actual per capita GDPs and denoted
by Gross Domestic Product Per Capita.
The government size: The government size is a
variable exerting important influence on occurrence
of corruption. Some scholars think expansion
of the government size is deemed as a country’s
absorption and extension of modern structures
and an adjustment of systems and structures
combining organization members and collective
interests effectively. Other scholars propose that a
larger government size also means that government
departments can control economic activities by
means of administrative examination and approval to
obtain more rent–seeking opportunities, so expansion
of the government size is one of the main reasons for
corruption. For China, the number of government
officials measured according to the standard of
60

fiscally dependent population is quite large and
expands too fast, which is not suitable for China’s
current level of economic development and the public
services provided by the government. This study
selected the government size as a control variable
for measuring the degree of corruption, represented
by various areas’ proportions of employees in public
administration and social organizations to employees
in all units and denoted by government.
Government officials’ relative pay: The
occurrence mechanism of officials’ corruption shows
that one of the reasons for occurrence of officials as
rational economic individuals is the influence of pay.
In today’s empirical studies, most documents show
that public servants’ high pay can alleviate corruption.
However, because some areas or departments
use extra–budgetary funds to distribute internal
subsidies in periods when local governments’ extra–
budgetary funds expands rapidly, public servants’
pay is higher, they provide soil for departmental and
collective corruption. But some scholars point out
upon research that as salaries rise, China’s degree of
corruption becomes worse, and that there is a positive
correlation between high pay and corruption. This
paper selects public servants’ relative pay as a control
variable for measuring the degree of corruption,
represented by proportions of the pay of employees
in public administration and social organizations to
the average pay of employees (because there are no
data of public servants’ pay in statistical yearbooks,
we use “the average pay of employees in public
administration and social organizations”) as denoted
by wage.
Separation of powers at the municipal level:
There are two completely different views on
the inf luence of separation official powers at
the municipal level on corruption. One view is
represented by Weingast (1995), Huther&Shah (1998)
and Fisman&Gatti (2002). They think there is a
significant negative correlation between separation
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of powers and officials’ corruption. Scholars
represented by Wu Yiping hold an opposite view,
thinking separation of the government’s powers
increases demand for bribery and worsens the
problem of corruption. For this variable, we select
the assessment method adopted by Yu Qin (2013)
in Input of Resources for Mainland China’s Fight
against Corruption: Regional Differences, Causes and
Influences. Separation of powers at the municipal
level=fiscal expenditure at the municipal level/
total fiscal expenditure at the provincial level. A
higher proportion indicates the city’s high financial
autonomy and a lower proportion indicates the city’s
low financial autonomy. This variable is denoted by
decentral.
(3) Model design
According to analysis of existing documents
and the research purpose of this paper, the following
quantitative models were established:

The first model tests hypothesis H1, and the
subscript i represents the cities where the municipal
Party committee secretaries were sacked after the
Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China (23 in the treatment group) and
the cities where no municipal Party committee
secretary were sacked after the Eighteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (22
in the control group), 45 in total. Because variable
corruption is the proportion of the number of
people involved in cases of embezzlement, bribery,
malfeasance and infringement placed on file by
the procuratorate every year to the number of local
government officials as defined above (number of
people involved in cases placed on file/number of
government officials), we use it to measure the 45
sample cities’ degrees of corruption. Independent

variable sacked is a dummy variable, and its
coefficient α1 measures the influence of the top
leader on a city’s degree of corruption. Xi is a control
variable influencing the degree of corruption,
including gdppc, wage, gov and decentral, and αj
(j=1、2、3、4) represents these variables’ influence
on a city’s degree of corruption. ε is a random
distracter, representing the elements influencing the
level of corruption but not captured by the model.
The second model tests hypotheses H2, H3 and
H4 (H4a, H4b and H4c).
The subscript i represents the 23 sample cities
where the municipal Party committee secretaries
were sacked after the Eighteenth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China. Because variable
corruption is the proportion of the number of
people involved in cases of embezzlement, bribery,
malfeasance and infringement placed on file by
the procuratorate every year to the number of local
government officials as defined above (number
of people involved in cases placed on file/number
of government officials), we use it to measure
the 23 sample cities’ degrees of corruption. The
independent variables include tenure, working
life and where, and β1 β2 β3 are the corresponding
variables’ coefficients measuring their influence
on the degree of corruption. Xi is a control variable
influencing the degree of corruption, including
gdppc, wage, gov and decentral, and βj (j=4、5、
6、7) represents these variables’ influence on a
city’s degree of corruption. ε is a random distracter,
representing the elements influencing the level of
corruption but not captured by the model.

3. Quantitative tests and research
findings
3.1 Descriptive statistics
After the Eighteenth National Congress of
the Communist Party of China, China’s overall
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degree of corruption showed a stable trend. In the
four years from 2012 to 2015, the proportion of the
number of government officials involved in cases
of work–related crimes placed on file fluctuated
around 0.0033. The proportion of municipal Party
committee secretaries involved in cases of work–
related crimes placed on file rose notably from 0.009
in 2013 to 0.048 in 2015. (See Figure 1)
A total of 36 municipal Party committee
secretaries were sacked after the Eighteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China,
involving 17 provinces and autonomous regions; 7
in Henan, 4 in Shanxi, 3 in Sichuan, 3 in Yunnan, 3
in Guangdong, 2 in Anhui, 2 in Hebei, 2 in Jiangsu,

National proportion of cases placed on file
Propor tion of municipal Par t y com m ittee
secretaries involved in cases placed on file

Figure 1 National Proportion of People Involved in Cases of Work-Related
Crimes Placed on File after the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China and Proportion of Sacked Municipal Party Committee
Secretaries

Table 1 Information on the Municipal Party Committee Secretaries Sacked after the Eighteenth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China
City

Name

Year of
Birth

Length of
Serving as
Secretary

Length
of Work

Original Post

Time of
Downfall

Luoyang

Chen Xuefeng

1958

2.5

2.5

Chuzhou

Jiang Shan

1962

2

5.5

Nanning

Yu Yuanhui

1964

2

2

Xining

Mao Xiaobing

1965

2.5

5

Dispatch from a provincial
department
Promotion in the same city
Dispatch from a provincial
department
Promotion in the same city

Guangzhou

Wan Qingliang

1964

3.5

4

Promotion in the same city

2014

Zhuhai

Li Jia

1965

5

5

2016

Kunming

Zhang Tianxin

1955

2.5

2.5

Transfer from another place
Dispatch from a provincial
department

Kunming
(Qujing)

Gao Jinsong

1963

2

2

Transfer from another place

2015

Jinan

Wang Min

1956

3

3

Nanjing

Yang Weize

1962

3

3

Taiyuan

Chen Chuanping

1962

4

4

Longyan

Huang Xiaoyan

1960

2.5

6

Dispatch from a provincial
department
Transfer from another place
Dispatch from a provincial
department
Transfer from another place

2016
2015
2015
2014

2014

2014
2015
2015
2014

Maoming

Liang Yimin

1964

1.5

4.5

Promotion in the same city

2015

Ya’an

Xu Mengjia

1957

7.5

8.5

Promotion in the same city

2013

Zaozhuang
Zunyi
(Qiandongnan)
Daqing

Chen Wei

1966

3

7.5

Promotion in the same city

2015

Liao Shaohua

1960

7

7

Transfer from another place

2013

Han Xuejian

1961

6.5

10

Promotion in the same city

2015

Anyang

Zhang Xiaodong

1963

2

10.5

Promotion in the same city

2013
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City

Name

Zhumadian

Liu Guoqing

1957

Length of
Serving as
Secretary
1

Yuncheng

Wang Maoshe

1957

Huainan

Fang Xiping

Xingtai

Wang Aimin

Year of
Birth

Length
of Work

Time of
Downfall

Original Post

6

Promotion in the same city

2014

1.5

1.5

2015

1958

1.5

1.5

1958

3

3

Transfer from another place
Dispatch from a provincial
department
Transfer from another place

2015
2014

Pingxiang

Chen Weimin

1959

1

6

Promotion in the same city

2015

Lianyungang

Li Qiang

1955

3

3

Transfer from another place

2014

Datong

Feng Lixiang

1957

6.5

8.5

2014

Ziyang

Li Jia

1966

5.5

5.5

Xinzhou

Dong Hongyun

1956

5.5

5.5

Promotion in the same city
Dispatch from a provincial
department
Transfer from another place

2014
2014

Kaifeng

Qi Jinli

1959

3.5

3.5

Transfer from another place

2014

Chengde

Zheng Xuebi

1958

3.5

3.5

Transfer from another place

2015

Sanmenxia

Yang Shuping

1957

4

7

Promotion in the same city

2015

Dali

Chu Zhongzhi

1967

1.5

1.5

Transfer from another place

2015

Wuhai

HouFengqi

1962

2.5

7.5

Promotion in the same city

2015

Taizhou

Wu Weirong

1963

2.5

6

Promotion in the same city

2015

Nanchong

Liu Hongjian

1962

7.5

7.5

Transfer from another place

2014

Jiaozuo

Sun Likun

1957

3

8

Promotion in the same city

2016

Sanmenxia

Zhao Haiyan

1963

0.5

5

Promotion in the same city

2016

0.008
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
Wuhai, Inner Mongolia

Kaifeng, Henan

Chengde, Hebei

Ziyang, Sichuan

Xingtai, Hebei

Lianyungang, Jiangsu

Huainan, Anhui

Yuncheng, Shanxi

Zhumadian, Henan

Zaozhuang, Shandong

Zunyi (Qiandongnan), Guizhou

Maoming, Guangdong

Taiyuan, Shanxi

Longyan, Fujian

Jinan, Shandong

Nanjing, Jiangsu

Kunming, Yunnan

Kunming (Qujing), Yunnan

Xining, Qinghai

Guangzhou, Guangdong

Nanning, Guangxi

Luoyang, Henan

0
Chuzhou, Anhui

2 in Shandong, 1 in Jiangxi, 1 in Fujian, 1 in Inner
Mongolia, 1 in Zhejiang, 1 in Guizhou, 1 in Qinghai,
1 in Heilongjiang and 1 in Guangxi.
In view of specific cities’ circumstances, various
cities’ degrees of corruption are different. Huainan’s
degree of corruption is the lowest, the proportion
of people involved in cases of work–related crimes
placed on file being 0.000789; Xining’s degree of
corruption is the highest, the proportion of people
involved in cases of work–related crimes placed on
file being 0.00685.
3.2 Research findings
The influence of various factors on the level
of corruption is judged through OLS estimated
regression equation 1. The VIFs of the variables in
model 1 are all below 2, with no multicollinearity
problem. Model 1–1 does not include control
variable test results, the sacked coefficient is

Figure 2 Proportions of People Involved in Cases of Work-related Crimes
Placed on File in 23 Sample Cities where Municipal Party Committee
Secretaries Were Sacked

positive and it passes the significance test at the 0.01
level, showing corrupt municipal Party committee
secretaries have obvious influence on the degrees of
corruption at their places of service. After the control
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variables are included in the regression equation, the
estimated coefficient of the variable sacked is still
positive at the 0.01 level of significance, meaning
municipal Party committee secretaries’ corruption
does positively influence the degrees of corruption
at their places of service. In consideration of possible
existence of the heteroscedasticity problem in
regression, WLS was adopted for further testing, and
it still passes the test at the 0.01 level of significance.
Therefore, hypothesis H1 is established: A corrupt
municipal Party committee secretary worsens the
degree of corruption in the place of service.
Table 2 Model 1
OLS

WLS

Model 1-1 Model1-2
11.402*** 12.315***
sacked
（3.500）
（3.974）
5.324
gov
（5.553）
7.342
wage
（7.618）
0.003
decentral
（0.004）
–0.000
gdppc
（0.000）
R–squared 0.206
0.426

Model1-3
11.395***
（4.028）
11.314*
（6.350）
14.388***
（4.233）
0.007*
（0.004）
–0.000
（0.000）
0.485

F－test

6.957***

10.614***

4.337***

Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *
represents significance at the 0.1 level, **represents
significance at the 0.05 level, and *** represents
significance at the 0.01 level.

The influence of various factors on the level
of corruption is judged through OLS estimated
regression equation 2. Multicollinearity diagnosis of
model 2 shows the variables have multicollinearity
problems, so tenure and working life were
adopted to establish models separately. The tenure
coefficient of model 2–1 is positive and it passes the
significance test at the 0.05 level, showing the longer
a corrupt municipal Party committee secretary’s
term of office, the deeper the influence on local
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corruption. The working life coefficient of model
2–2 is positive and it passes the significance test at
the 0.1 level, showing the longer a corrupt municipal
Party committee secretary’s length of work at the
place of service (including the length of serving as
municipal Party committee secretary and the length
of holding other posts in the same place), the deeper
the influence on local corruption. Where 1 (dummy
variable) coefficients of models 2–1 and 2–2 are
positive and they pass the significance tests at the
0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively; where 2 (dummy
variable) coefficients are positive but fail to pass
the significance tests, showing that municipal Party
committee secretaries promoted locally have greater
influence on local corruption than those dispatched
from provincial departments and promoted or
transferred at the same level elsewhere, while there
is no significant difference between dispatch from
a provincial department and promotion in another
place or same–level transfer. To further eliminate
heteroscedasticity, models 2–3 and 2–4 were
established, the tenure coefficient is positive and
passes the significance test at the 0.05 level, and the
working life coefficient is positive and passes the
significance test at the 0.05 level. Where1 (dummy
variable) coefficient of model 2–3 is positive and
passes the significance test at the 0.05 level, and the
where1 (dummy variable) coefficient of model 2–4
is positive and passes the significance test at the 0.1
level. Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4a are established.
The longer a corrupt municipal Party committee
secretary’s term of office, the higher the level of
local corruption. The longer a corrupt municipal
Party committee secretary’s length of work at
the place of service, the higher the level of local
corruption. Municipal Party committee secretaries
promoted in the same city have greater influence
on local corruption than those dispatched from
provincial departments and promoted or transferred
at the same level elsewhere.
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Table 3 Model 2
OLS
Model
Model
2-1
2-2
4.002**
tenure
（1.959）
3.356*
working life
（1.749）
14.974** 15.284*
where 1
（7.062） （8.504）
3.639
2.444
where 2
（6.127） （6.342）
5.857
13.377
gov
（7.518） （7.729）
6.733
7.897
wage
（9.627） （9.693）
0.013**
0.017**
decentral
（0.006） （0.007）
–0.000
–0.000
gdppc
（0.000） （0.000）
R–squared 0.514
0.501
F－test
2.266*
2.153*

WLS
Model
Model
2-3
2-4
4.162**
（1.526）
4.006**
（1.565）
16.807** 13.305*
（6.647） （7.987）
4.505
2.753
（5.980） （5.587）
7.125
16.871*
（6.616） （8.665）
5.417
10.239
（10.272） （8.056）
0.015**
0.020***
（0.004） （0.006）
–0.000***
–0.000*
（0.000） （0.000）
0.581
0.534
2.974*
2.748*

Note: The numbers in the parentheses are standard
errors. * represents significance at the 0.1 level, **
represents significance at the 0.05 level, and ***
represents significance at the 0.01 level.

The estimated results of the two models with
respect to the control variables are as follows.
As for the government size, the two models both
show that the gov coefficients are positive but not
significant. The main reason is, just as Prof. Zhu
Guanglei said, the main problem of the number
of Chinese government officials is not the general
aggregate surplus but the structural surplus and
operational surplus. This shows the influence of the
government’s size and its power operation model
on the level of local corruption needs to be further
examined. As for public servants’ relative pay, only
model 1–3 shows wage has a significant influence
on the level of local corruption. This indicates that
the influence of public servants’ pay on the level
of local corruption is uncertain. As for separation
of powers at the municipal level, models 1–2 and 2
show decentralization has a significant influence
on the level of local corruption, and the coefficients

are positive. This conclusion verifies the view of Ni
Xing and other scholars, i.e. separation of powers
at the municipal level weakens the local fight
against corruption. Stronger municipal autonomy
leads to increasing the appeal for the realization of
self–interests and strengthens the motivation and
ability to realize the interests of local governments
and departments, thus giving rise to collective
corruption. As for economic development, both
models show gdppc has a negative influence on the
level of local corruption, and models 2–3 and 2–4
pass significance tests, the coefficient being –0.000,
showing economic development has very little effect
of curbing local corruption.

4. Conclusions and recommended
countermeasures
With the rapid development of information
technology, using big data to study corruption and
fight against corruption has become a trend of the
times. Because relevant data cannot be accurately
obtained for various reasons, this paper adopts
cross–sectional data instead of panel data to study
the inf luence of local top leaders’ corruption
and puts forward the following conclusions and
countermeasures.
Whether the Party’s local top leaders are clean–
fingered or not directly influences the political
ecology of the place of service. The longer a corrupt
top leader’s length of service is, the higher the degree
of corruption in the place of service is. If a top
leader holds office in the same place for long before
becoming the top leader, the influence on the degree
of local corruption is magnified. In other words, a
leading cadre working in the same place for a long
time can form a tightly integrated chain of interests
and easily form a community of interests. Once
appointed as a top leader, such a leader’s collective
corruption will corrupt more Party and government
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cadres and organization members and form an
interconnected corruption network. Therefore, in
the selection of Party and government chiefs, more
efforts should be made for selection in other places
and cross–departmental postings. For leading cadres
having served in the same places for long periods,
their integrity should be the focus of survey and
their local social networks should be investigated
to discover key nodes where corruption is likely to
occur and thus effectively avoid the occurrence of
promotion of officials having problems.
A sound power structure and operational
mechanism featuring mutual restriction and mutual
coordination among the decision–making power,
executive power and supervisory power should be
established to practically prevent local top leaders’
corruption. First, top leaders’ powers should be
separated and decentralized. Based on clear division
of work tasks and responsibilities, rules should
be made for each key link of exercising powers
to realize decentralization of powers so that top
leaders can only exercise their powers within the
scope defined by laws, regulations and disciplines.
Important matters such as decision–making on
projects, fund use, appointment and dismissals
must be studied and discussed collectively to limit
top leaders’ sole approval power and sole decision–
making power and make their powers decentralized
and incomplete. Second, the accountability system
should be strictly implemented. Supervision and
examination of top leaders’ implementation of rules
should be strengthened to enhance top leaders’
consciousness of rule implementation and hold them
accountable for acts of exercising powers in violation
of rules and systems. Top leaders who seriously
neglect work duties, fail to resolutely and steadily
improve Party conduct, promote integrity and

combat corruption in their areas and departments,
fail to effectively curb the spread of corruption within
their jurisdictions and have improper conduct and
corruption that harm people’s interests should be
held accountable, seriously and resolutely, according
to the requirement of “dual investigation of cases.”
Third, the system and mechanism of promotion and
demotion of top leaders should be improved. Several
Provisions on Advancing Promotion and Demotion of
Leading Cadres (For Trial) should be implemented
strictly to further establish and improve the rules and
standards for “promotion” and “demotion” of top
leaders. A scientific assessment mechanism should
be established to assess and evaluate top leaders
who evade responsibility, abstain from action,
have problems and are reported according to facts.
Meanwhile, the path of their demotion should also be
considered to form an institutional environment for
the benign circle of leading cadres’ promotion and
demotion and prevent expansion of leading cadres’
corruption and the emergence of their spillover
effect. Fourth, disciplinary inspection organs’
power of supervision over top Party leaders at the
same level should be strengthened. On the basis of
comprehensively promoting full coverage of Party
and government organs by dispatched disciplinary
inspection and supervision bodies, exploration
should be made to realize financial independence of
dispatched bodies and their persons–in–charge from
the departments they are dispatched to so that their
positions and those of local or departmental leading
cadres will be at the same level and they will be
entitled to attend Party committee or leading Party
group meetings as nonvoting delegates and exercise
the duty of supervision independently and effectively.
(Translator: CCTB Translation Service;
Editor: Jia Fengrong)

This paper has been translated and reprinted with the permission of Xinhua Digest, No.6, 2017.
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